LTRO and Global Equities

For all the chaos and prophecies of doom, the European “debt crisis” led to predictable solutions and a significant rally. I talked about the underlying dynamics of the EFSF, ESM and the flawed Euro late in September, and very little in the following weeks and months came as much of a surprise.

Since the Eurozone announced steps towards a quasi fiscal union and the ECB delivered an aggressive dose of monetary easing, we’ve witnessed a strong rally in risk assets, globally. The Long Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO) of the ECB on December 21st led to a take up of nearly 500 billion Euros. While many in the financial community saw the LTRO as a non-event, it should have been clear that we were now on a fundamentally different wicket.

The LTRO is consequential not because it addresses structural issues behind the Eurozone’s currency problems (it doesn’t), but because it has succesfully unclogged a banking system that was in danger of choking under the weight of bond market losses and a rapidly deteriorating economic atmosphere. Sentiment does have a feedback loop into the real economy. But, sentiment is tied to objective reality. The LTRO has been successful at reducing the risk of a banking crisis emanating out of Euorpe in the near-term and to that extent it has materially changed sentiment.

The LTRO effectively offers banks 3-year repo funds at the average benchmark rate (currently 1%). It therefore opens up the possibility of a carry trade on peripheral bonds and more importantly, it stems the rational desire for banks to offload Italian and Spanish bond holdings. Above all, it significantly reduces counter-party risk and improves liquidity. While the impact on individual bond markets isn’t entirely predictable, the net impact on the overall banking system is that risk and uncertainty have been materially reduced by the offer of long-term funds against deteriorating assets.

I view the unclogging of the banking system as being consequential to the real economy in the same way that a recovery works in the initial period. A change in economic sentiment from the final phase of contraction to the first period of expansion is marked by a degree of pent-up demand emerging that leads to above trend growth rates in the short-run. While we didn’t enter a technical recession, the prolonged muddle through economy of 2011 could lead to a significant boost to overall economic activity in the short-run. This has already been evident in recent PMI data accross most markets, as well as the latest non-farm payrolls data out of the US.

At this stage, continued above trend growth in the near-term is a rational hypothesis. However, in a broader, structural context certain data points will contain significant information about the health of the global rallyin equities. First, the only hope for Europe within the context of a solution that makes austerity a central goal is for Euerozone trade data to show significant surpluses. Continued expansion of the ECBs balance sheet could be accompanied by a Euro depreciation, which would offer the possibility of current account surpluses. This is the only effective mechanism which would avoid sustained economic contraction in the periphery.

Second, the future trajectory of commodity prices will contain valuable information. One of the reasons for signs of improvement in manufacturing activity has been that significant cooling down of commodity prices has made manufacturing activity in general more viable. Significant increases in the price of copper, coal, crude oil, as well as farm products could lead to another hit for aggregate demand and margins.

Third, there is evidence to suggest that the pace of economic recoveries is deeply tied to the housing market. If gains in the job market are sustained, a recovery in the housing market could therefore trigger a virtuous cycle of growth over the next couple of years.

This is an environment where understanding the dynamics (driven by data and events) and structure (driven by technicals) is necessary to generate returns. There is no reason to make secular projections in a market that’s driven primarily by strategic considerations. Maintaining optionality at every stage of the cycle is essential.

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Surplus nations aren’t immune

In a previous article on the EFSF, ESM and the flawed Euro, I expressed skepticism regarding the political process in Europe.

Considering the fact that individual countries don’t stand to benefit from the measures equally, it may be within the self-interest of certain member states to leave the EMU. Indeed, continued and repeated riots in the face of austerity measures and tax hikes in Greece are indicative of a system that faces tremendous political risk. It would be no exaggeration to say that the nature of the process could make political risk in Europe a grave and pressing danger.

Those dangers have been highlighted in recent weeks by what Richard Milne of the Financial Times has described as “Papandemonium”. Indeed, political risk has become a central theme in market movements, lately. While the indications are that the Greek referendum is unlikely to take place, the theme of political disquiet is likely to remain with us.

However, what Greece’s stance has really highlighted is the destruction of the creditor nation myth. In an article in the Financial Times, titled “Creditors can huff but they need debtors“, Martin Wolf articulated a key dynamic of the evolving financial crisis.

Three of the world’s four largest economies – China, Germany and Japan – are creditors: they run current account surpluses, in good and in bad times. They believe they are entitled to lecture debtors on their follies. China, an ascendant superpower, enjoys berating the US for its imprudence. Japan, a US ally, is more discreet. Germany’s ambitions are closer to home. It wishes to turn its Eurozone partners into good Germans, instead.

Yet, creditors are vulnerable. Their economies have a capacity to supply goods and services that borrowers desire far larger than their own residents will ever buy. Deficit economies are a mirror images: their capacity to supply such goods and services falls short of their demand. These surpluses and deficits are embedded in both kinds of economy.

Within creditor countries, the produces of tradeable goods and services are a powerful lobby for the supply of credit to debtors. Private funding will halt once financiers realise how bad their lending has been. Policymakers are then caught between throwing good money after bad or tolerating brutal adjustment, as their markets disapper. In punishing profligate borrowers, they also damage their own citizens.

This is a fundamental component of what I have earlier referred to as a global currency crisis, that must be appreciated. While significant global imbalances continue to undermine the prospects of the global economy, surplus nations are by no means immune to future problems. Surplus nations usually enjoy lower unemployment and fewer overt signs of economic stress, but their futures are inextricably linked to debtor nations. Events in Europe this week only go to illustrate that Germany isn’t in control of a resolution to the Greek situation. Within that paradigm lies both a threat, and an opportunity for policymakers.

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‘Super’ Mario Draghi: New face of the ECB

We have a new man in charge at the European Central Bank (ECB). The message from Mario Draghi was more dovish than what we’re used to from Trichet, but the approach isn’t fundamentally different. Draghi appeared open, transparent and at times even casual. He used the dreaded ‘R’ word, he ruled out playing the role of lender of last resort to individual governments, he lectured Euro-south on the need for reform and he ended the press conference with a “that’s all folks!”

So, who is Mario Draghi and what can we expect from the new president of the ECB? Draghi’s highly rated by his peers. He earned his PhD in economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in the mid 1970s. He’s got an impressive resume with a broad mix of teaching, government and corporate experience. He was a managing director at Goldman Sachs as recently as 2006, and he’s a trustee at the Brookings Institution.

What his background and recent interviews suggest is that we should expect a less conservative president of the ECB than his predecessor, Jean Claude Trichet. His tone is evidently more dovish than Trichet. But, the fundamental approach to the crisis remains the same.

The press conference offered significant insight. When asked about whether the ECB should play a role as lender of last resort to national governments, Draghi responded with a firm no. He said

It’s really, in a sense, pointless to think that sovereign bond rates could be stably brought down for a protracted period of time by outer, external interventions.

When asked  whether the governing council was worried about rising Italian bond yields, Draghi placed the onus squarely on the government.

No, We haven’t really been focusing on this and other similar situations in our discussions today … But it is clear that … the first and foremost responsibility for maintaining financial stability and orderly financial conditions lies with national economic policies.

There was a refreshing honesty and openness about Draghi’s tone and markets can look forward to getting a dose of plain speak from the new president. The rate cut itself was an unexpected positive for markets, and further rate action would not be surprising. However, anyone who’s looking for an ECB solution to Europe’s problems is going to be left disappointed.

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Euro Summit: More of the same from Brussels

The S&P 500 closed the week up 3.8% and stands set to clock its biggest monthly gain since 1974 (currently 12%). The October 26th summit was cheered by markets with a major global rally. Yet, the Euro Summit Statement doesn’t convey a comprehensive solution.

The greatest contribution to the current discourse on the fundamental problems facing the Eurozone comes from Modern Monetary Theory (MMT). In a previous article on the EFSF, ESM and the flawed Euro I pointed to structural problems that the Eurozone has so far failed to recognize. I argued that the currency system itself is a closed system because individual nations aren’t monopoly issuers of currency. However, the Euro Summit Statement suggests that Europe continues to view the current situation as a debt crisis. For example, one of the key declarations in the Euro Summit Statement says

All Member States of the euro area are fully determined to continue their policy of fiscal consolidation and structural reforms. A particular effort will be required of those Member States who are experiencing tensions in sovereign debt markets.

This is a troubling approach, not because deficits are inconsequential, but because it reflects an inadequate understanding of the source of current deficits. The solution to the Eurozone debt crisis does not lie in creating a balanced budget amendment to defeat the “bond vigilantes”. Instead, the Eurozone must establish a structure where it establishes its monopoly position within currency and bond markets. Modern monetary structures in the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and other countries are based on this paradigm.

It is no doubt a fair and accurate assessment that that the Greek system needs structural reform. However, structural reforms must be cushioned by significant currency devaluation, in order for Greece to regain trade competitiveness. Under any circumstance where countries such as Greece and Spain continue to operate with significant current account deficits, fiscal contraction will only exacerbate the problem and lead to significant economic contraction.

The Euro Summit Statement takes an approach of greater economic coordination as a structural solution.

We will further strengthen the economic pillar of the Economic and Monetary Union and better coordinate macro- and micro-economic policies. Building on the Euro Plus Pact, we will improve competitiveness, thereby achieving further convergence of policies to promote growth and employment. Pragmatic coordination of tax policies in the euro area is a necessary element of stronger economic policy coordination to support fiscal consolidation and economic growth. Legislative work on the Commission proposals for a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base and for a Financial Transaction Tax is ongoing.

However, the productivity gaps between Euro-north and Euro-south are unlikely to converge rapidly enough for mere coordinated policy action to be adequate. So why did the markets rally hard, this week and over the course of October?

Firstly, the European Summit Statement included proposals on recapitalizing banks, it avoided a messy Greek default (for the time being, at any rate) and it proposed credit enhancement on fresh issuance of bonds for all member countries. All three measures are reasonably credible methods of reducing the risk contagion through the banking system in the near-term.

Secondly, markets were simply deeply oversold heading into October. The German DAX chart is instructive.

Weekly DAX Chart, as of October 30 2011

Weekly DAX Chart, as of October 30 2011

From a trading perspective, it’s worth pointing out a couple of things. First, the really big macro picture, that this article is aimed at presenting doesn’t represent an immediate trading idea. Instead, it provides a big picture context to market movements.

Secondly, it’s always worth remembering that facts change. The efficacy of the current approach could be fundamentally altered by a firm commitment and greater clarity on the ESM. The G20 summit on the 5th of November may give the plan greater firepower and credibility. Mario Draghi may favor greater quantitative easing and present a model where the central bank is more actively involved. In short, this is a dynamic situation that requires constant monitoring and occasional re-assessment.

Lastly, from a trading perspective, levels around the 50 day moving average (6750+), for example, present the first legitimate test for the DAX. Skepticism of the plan as a whole may guide a degree of caution or bearishness around those levels, depending on how the evidence presents itself and your trading approach. Unless of course, you’re still convinced by Efficient Market Hypothesis and you’d rather gather a bunch of monkeys to throw darts at a clipboard!

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The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Technical Analysis

The Efficient Market Hypothesis has been at the center of a debate in the world of finance since its articulation in the 1960s. Eugene Fama is widely credited with the hypothesis, although its early origins can be traced back to the French mathematician, Louis Bachalier. The hypothesis relies on Fama and Samuelson’s work on the Random Walk Hypothesis which states that stock market prices evolve according to a random walk and thus stock market prices cannot be predicted.

The hypothesis has been at the heart of modern finance and concepts tied to it continue to be vital ingredients in widely used financial models including the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the Black-Scholes model (widely used to price derivative instruments).

The Efficient Market Hypothesis’ most consequential claim is that prices reflect all available information. The implication of this assertion is that if current prices fully reflect all information, the market price of a security will be a good estimate of its intrinsic value and no investment strategy can be used to outperform the market.

Despite its widespread acceptance in modern finance, the hypothesis has faced continued criticism. The majority of early arguments were primarily technical in nature. They would focus on asymmetrical information and excess volatility as evidence of market inefficiency. Others pointed to theoretical flaws such as the lack of incentive provided to market participants to gather and act on new information if in fact all information was instantaneously absorbed into the price of a security.

However, the theory continued to gain traction. Several academic studies found evidence of Brownian motion in stock market prices, supporting a key premise of the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Further studies focused on the role of market participants and Burton Malkiel provided tests that suggested a monkey throwing darts at a board with stock names on it was as likely to outperform the market as a wall street professional!

More fundamental criticisms of the Efficient Market and Random Walk Hypothesis’ have been articulated since the emergence of behavioral economics. Behavioral economists have displayed evidence of a laundry list of human biases, inconsistent with the premise of the efficient market hypothesis. Examples include a comfort in crowds or “herding” (Huberman and Regev, 2001), overconfidence based on little information (Barber and Odean, 2001), miscalibration of probabilities (Lictenstein, 1982) and evidence of “regret” (Clarke, 1994).

One of the greatest financial operators of our times offers more deep-rooted criticism that moves the debate on from correlation to causation. He points primarily to the difference between natural sciences and social sciences, to point to the instability of the equilibrium itself and the corresponding futility behind the ritualistic belief in market efficiency. In the crisis of global capitalism, George Soros wrote

Economic and social events, unlike the events that preoccupy physicists and chemists, involve thinking participants. And thinking participants can change the rules of economic and social systems by virtue of of their own ideas about these rules. The claims of economic theory to universal validity become untenable once this principle is properly understood.

While the book itself was aimed at broader implications of market failures on society, Soros makes further observations about markets that cannot afford to be ignored by academicians. For instance, he says that

Looking at currency markets, I discerned that prevalence of vicious and virtuous circles in which exchange rates and the so-called fundamentals that they were supposed to reflect are inter-connected in a self-reinforcing fashion, creating trends that sustain themselves for prolonged periods until they are eventually reversed.

Interestingly, Soros doesn’t limit his observation of cycles to speculative financial markets alone, but extends his critique to essentially articulate the basis of the business cycle. He says

Studying the banking system and credit markets in general, I observed a reflexive connection between the act of lending and the value of the collateral that determines the crediworthiness of the borrower. This gives rise to an assymmetrical boom/bust pattern in which credit expansion and economic activity gather speed gradually and may come to an abrupt end.

What Soros articulated is the gap between financial theory as presented at universities across the world, and financial theory as market practitioners see it. Interestingly, Eugene Fama has himself acknowledged the inadequacy of the Efficient Market Hypothesis in a strict sense.

You have to tell me something about risk and something about expected returns, and then I can determine whether returns actually deviate from that. Market efficiency cannot be tested independent of some model of equilibrium. This makes these two concepts sort of inseparable twins.

The “equilibrium” in risk markets isn’t a stable mechanism. That’s where technical analysis comes in. Infamously referred to as sharing a pedestal with alchemy by Burton Malkiel, Technical Analysis or the study of price (patterns, trends, cycles, waves, momentum) more closely represents a practitioners understanding of the economic world.

Participating in a competitive marketplace requires an outlook that is often at odds with theoretical economics. The implication isn’t that practitioners need to reject economic theory, but they do develop parameters within which they can interpret a dynamic process. So, for instance, a technician may spend his time studying the flow of funds, measuring market sentiment, studying price momentum or arriving at answers on where we are in the business cycle.

The implications of rejecting the Efficient Market Hypothesis in the academic community would be fairly profound. Perhaps, it would even lead civilization to build robust systems that aren’t built on the assumption of human infallibility. What’s more consequential for market participants, however, is to recognize, as Henry Ford once said, “you can’t learn in school what the world is going to do next year”.

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Global Currency Crisis: The need for Currency Reform

Free trade is a beautiful thing. It is, in the final analysis the only logical way of matching consumptive desire with productive ability in a global economy. Yet, trade and current account imbalances have been at the heart of the conditions that created the 2008 financial crisis. The problem facing global capitalism is, at its root, a problem of currency manipulation. Dukgeun Ahn has outlined the facets of Chinese currency manipulation that confront the World Trade Organization (WTO).

The fact that countries such as China and Russia manage their currencies (and thus their exchange rates) has meant that they consistently maintain large current account surpluses, that aren’t corrected by a strengthening currency over time. An artificially weak currency leads to a continuous rise in exports, without a corresponding increase in imports. Viewed another way, instead of the ensuing growth in employment and wages leading to increased consumption, it leads to increased savings.

Current Account Balance

Graph illustrating current account balances across major advanced economies, nations facing economic stress and emerging nations

Current account balances across major economies changed dramatically after 2001 when China was adopted as a member of the World Trade organization (WTO). Now, why do current account deficits matter? Returning to some of the identities from the article on Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), consider the following relationship

Since GDP = C + G + I + (X – M) and GDP = C + S + T, it follows that

(X – M) = (S – I) + (T – G), where

(X – M) = net exports; (S- I) = private savings and (T – G)= government savings

Another way of looking at this relationship is that since GDP = C + G + I + (X – M)

(X – M) = GDP -(C+I+G), that is (X – M) = GDP – Domestic Demand

It follows that GDP – C – G = I+(X – M), that is to say National Savings = I + (X – M)

That is then to say that National Savings – Investment = (Net Exports).

Consequently, if you look at the national savings – investment graph, it is a near replication of current account deficits. These are descriptive economic identities that must always hold true.

Savings minus Investment

Graph illustrating national savings minus investment, as a percentage of GDP across advanced economies, nations facing economic stress and emerging nations

It follows from the discussion above that sustained and sizable current account deficits ultimately lead to the accumulation of debt – whether in the form of private debt, or public debt. It is also evident that exchange rates are the only legitimate tool through which levels of productivity are translated into effective market prices. The current system of trade disregards this key component of a legitimate currency system. Instead, nations such as China and Russia have managed their exchange rates to facilitate exports and savings, forcing other nations to consume and borrow.

Put crudely, this has led to an age where Chinese production serves western consumption which is itself financed by Chinese savings. Initially, cheap Chinese imports led to improved standards of living in the west, but ultimately, the credit that fueled American consumption is unsustainable.

Similarly, the Euro as a currency has led to Germany accumulating surpluses at the expense of countries such as Spain and Greece. The Euro is ultimately a pool of higher northern productivity and lower southern productivity. It consequently undervalues German productivity, while simultaneously over-valuing Spanish or Geek productivity. The net consequence has been that Germany is able to export more goods and services than it otherwise would, while Spain and Greece are able to export fewer goods and services. The early years of the Euro also led to Spanish and Greek consumption being subsidize, but unsustainable debt levels within the framework of the Euro as a closed-currency system have led to credit spreads widening.

Alan Greenspan explained the north-south split eloquently in a recent article.

 The ranking of credit risk spreads by size across the eurozone in 2010 was almost identical to the ranking of the level of unit labour costs (relative to that of Germany), suggesting that the higher labour costs and prices have rendered “euro-south” less competitive and so more subject to credit risk. The more competitively priced net exports of the northern eurozone participants, in effect, more than covered the rising level of net imports of the south. In short, between 1999 and the first quarter of 2011, there has been a continuous net transfer of goods and services shipped from the north to the south. Northern Europe in effect has been subsidising southern European consumption from the onset of the euro on January 1 1999. It is not a recent phenomenon.

Both the American and European experience illustrate problems with subsidising consumption in this manner. While monetary policy can itself help subsidize the cost of borrowing in multiple ways, the unemployment crisis in the United States and economies such as Greece and Spain is a manifestation of unsustainable trade policies and doctored exchange rates. For trade to serve all, countries that generate large exports must subsequently consume more. Free floating exchange rates without central bank manipulation is the only legitimate means of ensuring that this is the case.

The good news is that prominent policymakers including Timothy Geithner recognized some of the severe challenges that global imbalances pose, as far back as 2005. Moreover, the Chinese Renminbi and the Russian Ruble have appreciated against the US dollar in recent years. The bad news is that an Ad hoc approach continues to prevail over comprehensive reform. Massive central bank reserves, rather than free-market functions dominate currency movements.

As the US senate intensifies pressure on China over its currency, this is a time for WTO to step in and enforce floating exchange rates consistent with market economies. A failure to do so will risk trade wars, currency manipulation and far greater risk and uncertainty than is necessary. This will in turn undermine global economic growth.

On the other hand, adopting principles of free-trade across a wider range of goods and services can lead to further enhancements in productivity, while simultaneously lifting large populations residing in the East out of poverty. Three years after the financial crisis, future growth has been undermined by a failure to build on the wave of global cooperation that marked the early stages of economic recovery. While 2008 was a manifestation of deep-rooted trade imbalances, the global trade architecture hasn’t been reformed adequately to promote sustainable global growth.

The underlying principle must be to enable the market to use exchange rates and credit spreads to price relative productivity levels. Instead, trade is marked by a currency system with currency blocks and fixed rate mechanisms and by central banks that have vested interests engaging in competitive devaluation. QE, operation twist, transferring private debt to public debt and various monetary policy tools have largely succeeded at reversing an increase in the cost of credit that followed the collapse of Lehman. However, the crisis will return once more, unless trade flows are balanced in a sustainable manner. We are still in the midst of a global currency crisis.

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EFSF, ESM and the flawed Euro

Europe is scrambling to put together a European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) that emboldens it with enough firepower to try and fight the rising cost of Spanish and Italian debt. Yet, after a failure to effectively deal with the situation in Greece, opinion is divided. Emily Cadman and Robert Minto of the Financial Times have tracked the timeline of the Greek debt crisis in an interactive graphic. The twin questions now are a) why haven’t the measures worked so far, and b) what needs to be done?

The problem thus far has been of an inadequate diagnosis. Europe has looked at the situation as a debt crisis, focusing on austerity measures in every country where the bond market reacted negatively. The ensuing debate has revolved around how to ensure that countries return to balanced budgets within a timeline acceptable to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) at large.

The measure that most leaders quote while advocating cuts in fiscal deficits is that gross debt/GDP ratios are too high. However, this explanation is both simplistic and extremely dangerous. Consider the following graph depicting gross debt/GDP ratios across the EMU, as well as major advanced countries including Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom.

Gross Dent to GDP Ratio

Gross Debt/GDP Ratio: A conventional measure of sovereign risk

Base on the traditional view that gross debt/GDP is a primary determinant of sovereign risk, the graph would suggest that Japanese bond yields should be rising dramatically, as investors demand higher yields in return for the escalating risk associated with Japanese debt. Yet, for 20 years, yield on the Yen has headed lower, matched by low rates of inflation, negligible growth, extremely low interest rates from the Bank of Japan and an expansion of the BOJ’s balance sheet. The following graph illustrates the yield on a 10 year Japanese bond.

10 Year Japanese Bond Yield

Declining bond yields on 10 Year Japanese bonds

Simply put, the conventional measure of sovereign risk does not explain the data. The central lesson of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) is that monopoly issuers of currency enjoy an intrinsic advantage in bond markets because their ‘default risk’ is contained by their ability to issue fresh currency. The central problem for individual countries in the EMU is simply that they aren’t monopoly issuers of currency.

In this context, the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) is nothing more than a stop-gap measure. Its architecture is inadequate and it fails to resolve fundamental currency issues that plague the EMU. Europe needs to go further in order to resolve structural issues.

There are two major structural problems that must be addressed. First, the EMU must create a mechanism that reasonably allows Spain, Italy or Greece to embark on a path of quantitative easing, individually. This is vitally important because it means that these countries must have the ability to finance their fiscal deficit using fresh issuance of currency. This would significantly alter measures of default risk in the secondary market.

Second, the EMU must create an effective fiscal mechanism through which it addresses the north-south divide that currently plagues the currency. In fact, the difference in everything from productivity to unemployment to GDP growth poses questions on how the current monetary policy tools and a single interest rate can be representative of the region as a whole. Consider for instance, the disparate current account balances within the EMU.

Current Account Balance (EMU)

Graph illustrating disparate current account balances within the EMU

If anything, the EFSF on its own sets a dangerous precedent. The fact that the EMU will collectively be at risk for bonds issued by the periphery is very likely to increase the pressure on these countries to cut their budget deficits. In certain cases, this may be necessary. However, in countries where a strong Euro leads to sustained current account deficits, the policy can cause severe economic contraction because there will be no effective mechanism for these countries to regain competitiveness.

There are signs that Europe has belatedly recognized the structural flaw to its current monetary system. In December 2010, the European Union amended Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The amendment reads as follows:

The Members states whose currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality.

The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is, in may ways, Europe’s first serious attempt at structural reform. The current timeline of February 2013 may have to be brought forward. However, this is a reform that would be consequential in terms of strengthening the bond markets of member nations.

The ESM can grant short-term or medium term stability support to a euro-area Member State, which is experiencing severe financing problems. Access to an ESS (ESM Stability Support) will imply a macroeconomic adjustment program with adequate policy conditionality commensurate with the severity of the underlying imbalances in the beneficiary Member State. The length of the programme and maturity of the loans will depend on the nature of the imbalances and prospects of the beneficiary Member States regaining access to financial markets within the time that ESM resources are available.

While the ESM is an important first step, it is likely to remain incomplete in the absence of a fiscal union or a mechanism that is proactive rather than reactive. In particular, the mechanism doesn’t address currency issues (and thus, allied competitiveness issues) that continue to work against the periphery. What is also of concern is that the mechanism was setup in a manner which avoided the need for a referendum.

Considering the fact that individual countries don’t stand to benefit from the measures equally, it may be within the self-interest of certain member states to leave the EMU. Indeed, continued and repeated riots in the face of austerity measures and tax hikes in Greece are indicative of a system that faces tremendous political risk. It would be no exaggeration to say that the nature of the process could make political risk in Europe a grave and pressing danger.

In the short-run, taking default risk off the table in the case of Spain and Italy, providing greater liquidity to the banking system and re-capitalizing troubled financial institutions should be considered a positive for markets. A well considered EFSF, with a revised timeline on the ESM could achieve those goals.

However, over the long-term, Europe must decide on whether it is prepared to form a larger fiscal union and work towards reducing the north-south divide. The alternative, of allowing individual countries the option of returning to individual currency systems is not without merit. While current measures may buy Europe a certain amount of time to consider its future, the EMU must realize that it is dealing primarily with a flawed currency system that requires structural reforms beyond what is currently on the table.

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Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) and Quantitative Easing

The world changed on August 15, 1971 when Bretton Woods II came into existence. A fundamentally new paradigm was created, but recent debates have illustrated a basic lack of understanding about key facets of our monetary system. As terms such as “insolvency”, “bankruptcy” and “default” are thrown around loosely while talking about sovereign debt, it’s worth making a key distinction between monetary systems where (a) the state enjoys a monopoly over the issuance of fresh currency and (b) a floating exchange rate mechanism exists, and systems where this is not the case.

While talking about US debt recently, Alan Greenspan articulated this fundamental issue stating

The United States can pay any debt it has because we can always print money to do that. So there is zero probability of default.

The framework that best describes the monetary system of nations such as the United States is Modern Monetary Theory (MMT). The following Wikipedia summary is instructive.

Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) aims to describe and analyze modern economies in which the national currency is fiat money, established and created exclusively by the government. In MMT, (1) money enters circulation through government spending; (2) Taxation is employed to establish the fiat money as currency, giving it value by creating demand for it in the form of a private tax obligation that can only be met using the government’s currency. (3) An ongoing tax obligation, in concert with private confidence and acceptance of the currency, maintains its value. Because the government can issue its own currency at will, MMT maintains that the level of taxation relative to government spending (the government’s deficit spending or budget surplus) is in reality a policy tool that regulates inflation and unemployment, and not a means of funding the government’s activities per se.

The theory was developed by economist G.F. Knapp in the 1920s.

While there are important philosophical issues involved in the adoption of a currency backed by nothing but faith in government, MMT is primarily a tool to understand the fiat money system when a state has a monopoly over the issuance of currency. That is, it’s essentially a descriptive theory, not a prescriptive one.

There are broadly four key facets to understanding MMT.

1) The government must spend the currency into existence: 

This is the basis of modern monetary theory and of vital importance. In a fiat money system, the government must first spend money, in order to generate a currency in which it taxes its citizens. That is to say, government creates the taxes it collects through its spending. It is also to say that spending comes before funding.

This is an important way in which Bretton Woods II altered the landscape of the monetary system. Under the gold standard, bonds were issued due to revenue constraints caused by a lack of adequate reserves. Today, the primary purpose behind bond issuance is to help central banks hit their target rates. There are no revenue constraints anymore. In fact, Bretton Woods II was created for this very purpose.

2) Since GDP = C + G + I + (X – M) and GDP = C + S + T

C = Consumption, G = Government Spending, I = Investment, X – M = Net Exports, S = Saving, T = Taxes

It follows from the above equations that (G – T) +  (I – S) + (X – M) = 0

Based on the equations above, it follows that under conditions where households and the private sector need to save in order to reduce leverage on their balance sheet, the government must spend more than it takes in, in taxes. MMT illustrates that by doing so it adds financial assets to the private sector.

Gavyn Davies of the Financial Times brings to light a similar relationship. Do note, Davies isn’t using the equations above in the same form. He describes the framework he uses

The financial balance of each sector is equal to its income less its total expenditure. A financial surplus indicates that the sector is a net acquiror of financial assets, while a deficit indicates that the sector is running down its net assets (or increasing its borrowing) to finance its activities. Because the three sectors cover all of the activities of the US economy, at home and abroad, their financial balances must sum to zero.

US Sectoral Financial Balances

Davies argues that

(The private) sector includes both households and corporations, and in most economies it tends to record a small surplus most of the time. This was true in the US until the late 1990s, when the household sector started to run a financial deficit. Basically, rising equity prices, and then rising house prices increased personal wealth, and this induced households to reduce the amount they saved out of current income. As a result of this deficit, the private sector’s leverage ratio (the stock of outstanding debt/income) rose to record levels.

After 2007, falling house prices and the financial panic caused both households and companies to slash their spending relative to their income, and to generate excess cash. The shift in the private balance was a remarkable 14 per cent of GDP, and the consequent collapse in spending caused the recession. Meanwhile, the extra cash was devoted to paying down net debt, so the leverage in the private sector balance sheet started to decline

In order to better appreciate these relationships, modern monetary theory makes a distinction between horizontal transactions that occur within the private sector, and vertical transactions that occur between government and the private sector.

3) Horizontal Transactions

Modern Monetary Theory labels any transaction within the private sector a “horizontal transaction”. In particular, MMT analyzes the impact of banking transactions. It concludes that as a matter of accounting, loans within the private sector will always necessarily create a liability and a deposit equal in magnitude. That is to say that when a bank extends a fresh loan, a corresponding deposit is created somewhere in the banking system.

4) Vertical Transactions 

MMT labels any transaction between the private sector and the government sector a “vertical transaction”. The terminology is aimed to distinguish these transactions from horizontal transactions which occur within the private sector.

When the government spends, the treasury disburses funds by crediting bank accounts. The other side of this transaction is that its account at the Federal Reserve is debited. Consequently, this is a transaction where the deposit within the banking system doesn’t have a corresponding liability within it.

The primary forms of vertical transactions include taxation and government spending. During taxation,  private bank accounts are debited and hence reserves in the commercial banking sector fall. When the Federal government spends, Treasury will debit its cash operating account at the central bank, and deposit this money into private bank accounts. This money adds to the total reserves of the commercial bank sector.

The Federal Reserve and Quantitative Easing

Ever since the Federal Reserve announced its first round of quantitative easing some argued that high inflation, or even hyper-inflation were around the corner. One of the graphs that convinced people that there was no other logical argument was the following graph illustrating the dramatic growth of the monetary base after 2008.

Monetary Base

However, the argument that an expansion of the monetary base itself would lead to inflation or even hyper-inflation immediately was deeply flawed. In a recent paper on why banks are holding excess reserves, Todd Keister and James McAndrews of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York explain the basis of the fractional reserve banking system and how it relates to the central bank. They highlight the importance of the fact the Federal Reserve started paying interest on deposits held with it in October 2008. This tweaking of policy had an important impact on the behavior of banks. Keister and McAndrews make the following observations:

The total level of reserves in the banking system is determined almost entirely by the actions of the central bank and is not affected by private banks' lending decisions. The liquidity facilities introduced by the Federal Reserve in response to the crisis have created a large quantity of reserves. While changes in bank lending behavior may lead to small changes in the level of required reserves, the vast majority of the newly created reserves will end up being held as excess reserves almost no matter how banks react.
most central banks now pay interest on reserves. When reserves earn interest, the multiplier process stops sooner. Instead of continuing to the point where the market interest rate is zero, the process will now stop when the market interest rate reaches the rate paid by the central bank on reserves. If the central bank pays interest on reserves at its target rate, the money multiplier completely disappears. In this case, banks never face an opportunity cost of holding reserves and, therefore, the multiplier process described above does not even start.
When banks earn interest on their reserves, they have no incentive to lend at interest rates lower than the rate paid by the central bank. The central bank can, therefore, adjust the interest rate it pays on reserves to steer the market interest rate toward its target level. The Federal Reserve began paying interest on reserves, for the first time in its history, in October 2008. This action was taken to "give the Federal Reserve greater scope to use it lending programs to address conditions in credit markets while also maintaining the federal funds rate close to the target established by the Federal Open Market Committee.

Thus, monetary policy of this sort was designed primarily to facilitate liquidity within the banking system, but paying interest on deposits at par with target rates reduced the opportunity cost for banks holding reserves. Consequently, there was no transmission mechanism that would result in inflation.

In fact, the measures were introduced primarily to prevent the banking system from freezing up completely. Once banks lost faith in each others’ credit worthiness during the crisis, inter-bank lending came to a virtual standstill. The flexibility that allows the banking system to promote healthy credit creation wherever it occurs in the system was absent. A continuation of such a condition would have led to the undesirable outcome of loans that should have been made, not being made.

Composition of Total Credit

As the graph above illustrates, the Fed’s extraordinary measures did not lead to banks extending fresh credit to the private sector. The only major spike in the graph was of banks holding cash and cash equivalents. This is precisely what quantitative easing was designed to do. Reduce counter-party risk within the system, and gives banks the confidence to use the inter-bank markets and credit swaps as they usually would.

Does this suggest governments should run massive deficits to fund the private sector?

The analysis to this point presents a benign view of deficit spending. To recognize that the government spends the currency into existence is to recognize that governments holding debt don’t suffer the same kind of solvency issues that businesses and households do. It is also evident that central banks greatly influence, and usually determine the cost of credit. However, to conclude that running indefinite fiscal deficits and cranking up national debt is a sustainable solution would be to misunderstand the basis that holds the monetary system together.

The central lesson of MMT is that a fiat money based system, like any other depends on its ability to provide an incentive for people to be productive. Because of the unique influence that vertical transactions have on the system, the role of government is particularly important. However, MMT doesn’t prescribe a particular role for government.

At their best, monetary systems facilitate exchange and encourage productivity. At their worst, they radically distort the incentive structure and promote undesirable behavior. There are no grand conclusions to modern monetary theory. It is instead, a valuable descriptive tool that enables you to recognize what the monetary system is trying to achieve and to be aware of distortions, glaring imbalances and potential threats.

Understanding it is a useful point of departure while navigating a complicated global system. The uniqueness of the fiat money system as explained by Modern Monetary Theory lies in the reasonable conclusion that if inflation can be avoided or contained, a heightened debt/GDP ratio in itself is very unlikely to lead to “bond vigilantes” enforcing discipline on the bond market in the case of monopoly issuers of currency. Governments thus hold counter-cyclical powers that can be used more effectively than previous monetary systems such as the Gold standard. That very flexibility can also be extremely destructive.

It’s worth remembering that within the European Monetary Union (EMU), individual European nations can’t issue fresh Euros. They therefore aren’t monopoly issuers of currency. While currency systems such as the US dollar and Japanese Yen can employ counter-cyclical measures during deep contractions of the private sector, individual European nations enjoy no such powers. A high debt/GDP ratio is in and of itself a reason for the “bond vigilantes” to attack the bond markets of such nations.

The Economic & Monetary Union (EMU) and MMT

The European Monetary Union (EMU) employs a structure in which individual nations such as Italy, Greece or Spain can’t issue fresh currency independently. They therefore operate in a manner analogous to individual states in the US, rather than as sovereign nations. At the same time, the absence of a unified European fiscal policy leaves the currency without an effective policymaker. Therefore, even in the absence of inflation (which may cause a legitimate loss of faith in currency), individual European nations can and often do face considerable pressure from “bond vigilantes”. In fact, individual European nations hold no adequate policy response tools when they face a deflationary spiral or the threat of an economic depression. This means that default risk in individual nations can increase substantially simply in light of a perceived threat of future economic contraction. Individual nations bond markets therefore can be subjected to severe pressure and market forces have the ability to push individual nations to the point of actual default. Individual nations can turn insolvent, for all practical purposes.

It would be beneficial to conclude, on the basis of MMT that these countries would have greater flexibility if they enjoyed the power to issue fresh currency, as individual, sovereign nations.

While the focus in this article has been on the architecture of the monetary system within a country, MMT can also be used as a tool to understand the global architecture and to ponder imbalances caused when individual parts of a broader system aren’t monopoly issuers of currency and/or don’t employ a floating exchange rate mechanism.

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